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CoNsnronoNAL LA.w-PUBLIC UsB RllQUIRBMBNT .AND nm PoWBR oP 
EMINENT DoMAIN-Under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act,1 an 
agency was created to redevelop blighted and slum areas. Pursuant to the mode 
of operation prescribed in the statute, the agency intended to purchase or take 
by eminent domain all the property in the vicinity of appellant's property. After 
getting title to all the property the agency was to lease or sell it to private enter-
prisers to redevelop the area according to the agency's comprehensive plan, 
which specified definite boundaries for various uses. Appellant brought this 
action to enjoin the condemnation of his business property, claiming that the 
statute was unconstitutional because it authorized condemnation of private 
property for other than a public use. The district court refused to enjoin the 
condemnation, construing the act to authorize condemnation only to remove 
or prevent conditions injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. 
Held, affirmed. The act authorizes condemnation not only for the purposes 
named by the district court but even in aid of developing a more balanced and 
attractive community. The courts' role in deciding if land is condemned for a 
public purpose is a limited one, being restricted to an inquiry whether it is taken 
for an object within the regulatory power of the government. Berman 11. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98 (1954). 
The clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution dealing with the 
power of eminent domain was first construed to be a two-fold limitation upon 
the power: just compensation must be paid, and property can not be taken unless 
it is taken for public use. 2 Some federal cases have interpreted the public use 
requirement to mean use by a substantial portion of the public,3 but the ma-
jority of cases have neither adopted this restrictive rule nor laid down any broad 
1 D.C. Code (1951) §§5-701-5-709. 
2 U.S. CoNST., amend. V, provides as follows: " ••. nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." Note that the court in the principal case 
talks of public purpose rather than public use. See 2 NICHOLS, fu.mraNT DoMAIN, 3d 
ed., §7.31 (1950). 
s Shasta Power Co. v. Walker, (D.C. Cal. 1906) 149 F. 568, affd. (9th Cir. 1908) 
160 F. 856; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 507 (1848); United States 
v. Certain Lands in Louisville, (D.C. Ky. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 137 (condemnation for slum 
clearance held unconstitutional). A corollary to this interpretation is the rule that only 
the amount of property which will actually be used by the public may be taken by eminent 
domain. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 A. 904 (1913); 
Richmond v. Carneal, 129 Va. 388, 106 S.E. 403 (1921). See also 46 CoL. L. Rnv. 108 
(1946); 20 So. CAL. L. REv. 99 (1946). 
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test of public bene6.t.4 Instead, most of the cases were decided on an individual 
basis, the movement always being toward a more liberal interpretation of "public 
use."5 Thus, approval was given for condemnation to provide a spur track to 
benefit a single manufacturer, 6 and to provide irrigation to benefit a single 
farmer.7 The Supreme Court has upheld condemnation where there was to be 
no use at all by the public, 8 and one court has even talked in terms of Congress' 
constitutional power to legislate in the area, with little or no concern about the 
public use limitation.9 In a 1945 opinion, the Supreme Court seemingly abdi-
cated to Congress the power to determine whether a taking by the federal gov-
ernment was for a public use.10 The principal case reasserts the intention of the 
Court to determine for itself whether a condemnation is for a public purpose, 
but the Court indicates that its role here is an extremely limited one. The 
Court states that if the object is within the powers delegated to the federal gov-
ernment, Congress has the power to realize it through the power of eminent 
domain. Improving the living conditions in, and increasing the beauty of, the 
District of Columbia are no doubt objects within the power of Congress by 
virtue of its authority to legislate for the district. Thus it is clear that the 
requirement of public use no longer exists11 and the only limits upon the fed-
eral government's power of eminent domain are the requirements that just 
compensation be paid12 and that the object falls within one of the enumerated 
powers. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution imposes the same limita-
tions upon the states' power of eminent domain as the Fifth Amendment imposes 
upon the federal government.13 Restrictions on the power of eminent domain 
· in state constitutions may be interpreted less liberally than the federal restric-
4 Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 25 S.Ct. 676 (1905); Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton 
Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30) 36 S.Ct. 234 (1906); Strickley 
v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 26 S.Ct. 301 (1906). 
5 See 2 N1cHOLs, EMINENT DoMAIN, 3d ed., §7.2 (1950). 
6 Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 28 S.Ct. 331 (1908). 
7 Clark v. Nash, note 4 supra. 
s United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 16 S.Ct. 427 (1896); 
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 44 S.Ct. 92 (1923); Old Dominion Land Co. v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 46 S.Ct. 39 (1925). 
9 Barnidge v. United States, (8th Cir. 1939) IOI F. (2d) 295 at 298. 
10 "We think it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a 
public use •••• " United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 at 551, 66 S.Ct. 
715 (1946). Two justices disagreed with the statement that only Congress could decide 
what was a public use, but they agreed with the decision. One justice interpreted the 
majority opinion not to deny the power of the court to decide what was a public use. 
11 See 58 YALB L.J. 599 (1949). 
12 In view of this result it is interesting to note the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Holmes in Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 at 260, 
25 S.Ct. 251 (1905): " ••• I am not aware of any limitations in the Constitution of the 
United States upon a State's power to condemn land within its borders, except the require-
ments as to compensation." 
1a Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 17 S.Ct. 130 (1896); Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581 (1897). 
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tions.14 The decision in the principal case should be of aid to those state courts 
which have not yet reviewed the constitutionality, under the state constitution, 
of state redevelopment statutes making liberal use of the power of eminent 
domain. 
Donald F. Oosterhouse, S.Ed. 
14 See Mandelker, ''Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment," 28 TULANB L. REv. 96 
(1953), for a discussion of this problem. Mandelker reports that state statutes similar to 
the statute in the principal case have been upheld in some twelve states and have been 
held unconstitutional in two states. 
